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Abstract
Interdiction policies by countries such as the U.S. and Aus-
tralia are embedded in these states’ perception of their ob-
ligations to asylum seekers as strictly territorially bound.
With the aim of limiting asylum seekers access to protec-
tion mechanisms, these policies are carried out in an
arena firmly within the reach of executive-driven actions
yet beyond the purview of constitutional or judicial safe-
guards. In the case of the U.S., the long-standing Haitian
interdiction policy illustrates the manipulation of this pro-
tection gap, and, in Australia, the administration’s reac-
tion to the Tampa incident in 2001 and the subsequent
policy developments provide further illustration. The
autonomy with which states carry out such policies poses
a significant threat to the refugee protection regime, espe-
cially the international norm of non-refoulement.
Résumé
Les politiques d’interdiction poursuivies par certains
pays, tel les États-Unis et l’Australie, reposent sur leur
conviction profonde que leurs devoirs envers les deman-
deurs d’asile sont strictement limités à leur territoire.
Dans le but de limiter l’accès des demandeurs d’asile aux
mécanismes de protection déjà en place, ces politiques
sont appliquées dans des lieux fermement sous le contrôle
des forces de l’ordre, tout en ne bénéficiant d’aucune ga-
rantie constitutionnelle ou judiciaire. Aux États-Unis, la
politique d’interdiction déjà ancienne envers les Haïtiens
illustre bien la manipulation de ces interstices dans la
protection, tout comme les politiques australiennes qui
ont suivi l’incident du Tampa en 2001. La grande liberté
dont disposent les États pour appliquer de telles politi-
ques constitue une menace pour le système de protection
des réfugiés, en particulier pour le respect du principe car-
dinal de non-refoulement.
I. Introduction
I
nterdiction policies highlight tensions in the current
relationship between the liberal democratic asylee-re-
ceiving state, the international human rights regime, and
the realities facing the asylum seeker. Embodying the dis-
course of the human rights regime in the context of globali-
zation, Soysal holds that “individual rights, expansively
redefined as human  rights on a  universalistic basis and
legitimized at the transnational level, undercut the import
of national citizenship by disrupting the territorial close of
nations.”1 In a similar vein, Jacobson notes a process of
“deterritorialization” whereby the “nation” is becoming de-
linked from the territorial state.2 The realities of interdiction,
however, present a stark contrast to this vision. The draco-
nian measure of forcing a ship from a country’s territorial
waters in order to avoid legal obligations exhibits, not def-
erence to a transnational rights bearing regime, but a reas-
sertion of the primacy of territoriality and boundedness of
the duty of protection. Even a ruling in an international
tribunal stating that such protection duties are attached to
states operating outside their physical boundaries does not
have the leverage of directly impacting state policy or juris-
prudence.3 Through their interdiction campaigns, the U.S.
andAustraliahavedemonstratedthe lacunabetweenthephysi-
cal spaces in which states exercise jurisdictional control and the
spaces in which they will assume juridical responsibility. The
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existence of such policies and the relative impunity with
which  states enact them  expose deficiencies in both the
institutional and legal mechanisms of the refugee protection
regime. The right to seek asylum, although provided for by
international human rights doctrines, remains a territorially
bounded claim.
While U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s codification of
interdiction policy in 1981 represented a formalization of
the use of interdiction as a form of immigration control, the
United States had been guilty before of turning vessels from
its shores at the cost of human life. Denying the U.S. St.
Louis, a passenger ship from Hamburg, Germany, permis-
sion to dock after being turned back from its original port
of call, Havana, had drastic humanitarian repercussions.
The year was 1939 – over nine hundred of the passengers
on board were Jews escaping Nazism. In the next few years,
perhaps after viewing Miami from the deck, hundreds of
the ship’s passengers perished in concentration camps.4
In the past decade, however, the encounter at sea be-
tween the asylum seekers and repelling state has become a
hallmark of the desperation on both sides in the prevailing
restrictionist climate. Apart from the long-standing Ameri-
can policy, until recently there has been no equal in terms
of a codified policy of interdiction. In August 2001, Austra-
lia resorted to interdiction in the midst of a highly publi-
cized standoff with the captain of the Tampa, a Norwegian
container ship seeking to off-load over four hundred res-
cued asylum seekers onto Australian territory. In the wake
of this incident, Australia has formalized the use of inter-
diction through new legislation relating to “off-shore arri-
vals.” Australia is not alone in the use of such strategies: in
the Mediterranean, Italy, France, and Spain have begun to
interdict vessels carrying North  Africans and  Albanians
struggling to reach their shores. The harmonization of
borders, and thus immigration policy, in the EU has made
it increasingly difficult for asylum seekers to reach their
shores, making sea arrivals, often organized by smugglers,
increasingly prevalent.
Interdiction policies are the most extreme example of a
trend of restrictionist, non-entrée policies implemented by
liberal democratic receiving countries to reduce illegal im-
migration. This set of policies includes carrier sanctions,
visa controls, and safe third country determinations. To the
detriment of refugee protection, the sweeping exclusiveness
of these policies does not discriminate between economic
immigrants and asylum seekers with legitimate protection
claims. Implicit to this “teleology of restriction” is the
assumption that many asylum seekers’ claims are not well-
founded and that refugee status is being used as a “revolving
door” for otherwise inadmissible entrants.5 This skepticism
is reflected by  a  set of “deterrence” policies  enacted to
complement the non-entrée regime. Governments seek to
dissuade potential asylum seekers, referred to as “queue
jumpers,” from making the journey through harsh deten-
tion policies upon arrival, expedited removal processes, and
a rollback in access to judicial review.
The combination of non-entrée policies with deterrence
measures by Australia and the U.S. undermines the ability
of genuine asylum seekers to avail themselves of protection.
The Australian government has gone so far as to sponsor
public information campaigns warning prospective immi-
grants about the crocodile-infested waters lining their bor-
ders.6 Dangerous generalizations regarding the nature of
asylum flows are driving this policy framework. While
refugee status is conceived as a highly individualized con-
dition, the labeling of thousands of people as “economic
migrants,” as has been the tradition with Haitians in the
U.S., prejudices the entire determination system against
fair, individual-based determinations. In Australia there
have been instances in which important officials within the
executive and Parliament have publicly undermined the
foundedness of claims by particular groups of asylum seek-
ers.7 Interdiction policies represent the most tangible mani-
festation of this exclusionary trend.
The present paper seeks to illustrate how non-entrée
policies, specifically interdiction,  signify an  assertion of
state sovereignty and confirm the predominance of territo-
rially based claims to protection by asylum seekers. While
the protection claims of asylum seekers have firm footing
once they are physically within a state’s territory, when they
find themselves in the spaces in between territorial bounda-
ries, prospects for protection are as tenuous as the unsea-
worthy vessels that are so often a hallmark of their grave
circumstances. The first section introduces the cases, U.S.
and Australian interdiction policies, and establishes a ra-
tionale for the comparison. The following section will ex-
plore the remaking of the condition of being “outside” in
the language of immigration, considering the plenary
power doctrine and the implications of extraterritoriality.
The final section contains commentary on the state of
refugee protection with respect to interdiction.
II. Interdiction in the U.S. and Australia: A
Framework for Comparison
While Australian and U.S. interdiction policies are essen-
tially homegrown, products of the countries’ respective do-
mestic political environments and regional conditions,
compelling parallels exist between the two. Essentially, they
are both concerned with the diversion of asylum seekers
from their shores. The overriding concern manifest in these
projects is the states’ discomfort with a self-diagnosed terri-
torial vulnerability. This perceived weakness has been com-
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batted with drastic measures to regain control over entry. In
both cases, the policies were introduced only after a series of
other deterrence measures had appeared to fail. The lead role
of the executive in initiating the interdiction measures in
Australia and the U.S. demonstrates the extent to which
immigration control measures were equated with questions
of national security. The importance of keeping potential
entrants physically outside a demarcated zone in both in-
stances reflects the power of protection mechanisms once
the line has been crossed. The role of an activist judiciary in
developing these protection mechanisms and in challenging
the development of restrictionist norms has been significant
in both cases. While governmental discourse surrounding
the policies has acknowledged international law and obliga-
tions regarding asylum seekers, the goal of reasserting sov-
ereignty clearly supersedes international responsibilities in
this regard.
Acknowledging the parallels between the interdiction
policies of these two countries leads to an inquiry regarding
the possibility of some kind of causal link. Given the Ameri-
can reputation for  unsavoury  exports and  the fact that
Haitian interdiction preceded Australia’s formal policy by
twenty years, the possibility that the U.S. policy served as a
precedent looms large. One of the many criticisms levied
by human rights advocates over the course of Haitian in-
tervention was that America was setting a negative example
for other countries and that refugee protection could suffer
exponentially as a consequence. Of special importance to
the legal community was the legitimizing of the treatment
of Haitians through the resounding victory of the state in
Supreme Court case Sale v. Haitian Centers Council (1993).
The late Arthur C. Helton, a lawyer at the helm of the
movement to challenge interdiction, called the Sale case “a
dangerous precedent at the international level,” with the
likelihood of being interpreted by some states “as an invi-
tation to use brutal forms of refugee control.”8
While America’s long-standing interdiction policy cer-
tainly aids the Australians in their ability to deny extrater-
ritorial responsibility, interdiction arose as a policy option
primarily as a result of domestic and regional develop-
ments. For this reason, the initial inquiry must lie, not in
the realm of precedent setting, which emphasizes the
agency of the state in responding to conditions, but in the
conditions themselves. There have been several attempts to
explain similarities across immigration policies in liberal
democratic countries along these lines. In a comparative
study of nine countries, Cornelius et al. defend a “conver-
gence hypothesis” which finds a “growing similarity” in the
policy instruments used in immigration control along with
the results of these policies and their reception by the
public.9 Acknowledging the importance of changes in the
international system, the authors hold that it is endogenous
factors that are the key determinants in immigration con-
trol.10 In a smaller-scale study focusing specifically on the
state of asylum, Joppke also emphasizes the importance of
a state-based framework in which “there is a convergence
on the erection of doubly restrictive asylum regimes.”11
Brief overviews of the interdiction policies of the two coun-
tries illuminate key points and will set the stage for further
inquiry.
U.S. Interdiction Policy: From Reagan to Clinton
When President Reagan proclaimed on September 29, 1981,
that illegal immigration had reached the level of a “serious
national problem detrimental to the interest of the United
States,” an interdiction policy explicitly directed at Haitians
was set in place that would survive ideological shifts in the
White House and the end of the Cold War.12 This Presiden-
tial Proclamation along with Executive Order 12324 of the
same day outlined the nature of the threat posed by an influx
of illegal immigrants, thereby activating the constitutional-
ity of presidential authority in such matters and granting the
Coast Guard the responsibility of protecting America’s
shores  from the  onslaught. The Coast Guard  was  given
authorization to stop and board ships on the high seas that
appeared to have the intentions of entering territorial waters
with human cargo in violation of immigration law. The
presidential directive ordered the Secretary of State to enter
into bilateral agreements with “appropriate foreign coun-
tries” to facilitate co-operation in deterring illegal immigra-
tion to the U.S. Haiti was the only state with which any such
agreement was ever negotiated, stipulating the return of
interdictees to their country of origin. In recognition of its
responsibilities not to refoule refugees, there was a provision
that “no person who is a refugee would be returned without
his consent.” Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
officials were stationed on board the Coast Guard cutters to
make the necessary determination as to the likelihood of
refoulement. The adequacy of this screening process was
soon to be challenged by the courts.
It would amount to a vast oversimplification to interpret
the Haitian interdiction policy initiated by Reagan in 1981
simply as a symptom of anti-immigrant feelings leading to
a newly aggressive restrictionism. If this were the case then
Haitians, estimated to represent only 2 per cent of illegal
immigrants at the time of the interdiction policy, would not
have been a logical target.13 Haitian policy must be viewed
in light of attitudes and policies towards Cuban asylum
seekers, beneficiaries since 1966 of the Cuban Adjustment
Act, which voided individual status determination require-
ments and granted Cubans automatic entry into the United
States. While the 1980 Refugee Act established a normative
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break in American law from the Cold War tradition of
conceiving of refugees as ideological symbols, long-stand-
ing approaches towards Cubans would continue to hold
sway over the legal conception of refugee status in Ameri-
can law. Haitians had the bad luck of arriving en masse on
the shores of southern Florida alongside Cubans in the late
seventies and early eighties. Indicative of the building pres-
sure in southern Florida, the INS was busy developing plans
in 1978 to expedite the removal of Haitians by way of mass
expulsion hearings motivated by the perception that cur-
rent backlogs and inefficiencies were attracting further
flows.14 The arrival of 125,000 Cubans and 25,000 Haitians
on the shores of Florida over a five-month period in 1980
threw the asylum system into crisis. Although President
Jimmy Carter granted “special entrant status” to both
groups, such a humanitarian gesture was unsustainable in
the face of such large flows. Due to the special legislation in
place welcoming Cubans and Fidel Castro’s outright refusal
to take back any new arrivals, the only opportunity to assert
control rested with the Haitians.15
The original interdiction policy introduced by Reagan
remained in place for eleven years, suffering from continu-
ous legal challenges regarding the nature of refugee deter-
mination procedures. A significant development in the
interdiction program, with important legal ramifications
for the question of asylum, was the use of the U.S. base in
Cuba,  Guantánamo  Bay, as a holding  pen  for Haitians
awaiting screening. Although these challenges resulted in
small victories, including temporary bans on repatriation
of Haitians, President George H.W. Bush’s issuance of the
Kennebunkport Order on May 23, 1992, rendered this
progress irrelevant.16 By including the following provision,
“nor shall this order be construed to require any procedures
to determine whether a person is a refugee,” Bush assured
that intercepted migrants would be summarily returned to
their country of origin, overriding the previous commit-
ment to avoid refoulement.
Flows had once again increased dramatically in the wake
of September the 30, 1991, military coup overthrowing
Haiti’s first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand
Aristide. In lieu of screening procedures before repatria-
tion, the Bush administration sought to divert potential
asylum seekers through the channels of in-country process-
ing, a mechanism “historically conceived as an additional
avenue of protection for refugees.”17
Despite President Bill Clinton’s defense of the principle
of first asylum and his criticism of the current policy during
the campaign, once in the White House, he continued the
interdiction program in the same fashion. Clinton’s atten-
tion to Haiti as a foreign policy priority acknowledged the
reality that even the most draconian immigration control
policies would not stop Haitians from making the journey.
Economic sanctions were imposed and ultimately a mili-
tary intervention carried out in attempt to stabilize the
political situation. The most significant court case regard-
ing interdiction was decided in the beginning of Clinton’s
first term. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council (1993) the
Supreme Court ruled 8 to 1 that Article 33 of the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee
Convention), protecting asylum seekers from refoulement,
did not have an extraterritorial effect. This ruling legiti-
mized the direct return of Haitians interdicted on the high
seas without any inquiry into their refugee status.
Clinton was ultimately forced to recognize the urgent
protection needs despite this ruling, however. This resulted
in the provision of safe havens at the Guantánamo base and
in other countries around the Caribbean. The persuasion
by the U.S. of countries in the Caribbean and Central
America to provide safe havens for Haitians demonstrated
a blatant shifting of the problem. As one critic said, with the
creation of safe havens in Honduras and Venezuela, “the
United States stood the principle of burden sharing on its
head.”18
Australia’s Interdiction Policies: The War on Smuggling
Compared to the long historical trajectory of Haitian inter-
diction, Australia’s policy is in its infancy. The legislation
outlining the new policy of interdiction, the Border Protec-
tion (Validation and Enforcement) Act 2001, was intro-
duced in September of that year to retroactively legitimize
action taken in late August by the Australian government.
Unlike the case of U.S. interdiction policy that developed
behind closed doors over time and was not a reactive meas-
ure taken in response to one single event, Australia’s policy
was formed in the midst of a standoff at the edges of its
territorial waters. In late August 2001 a Norwegian cargo
ship, the Tampa, responded to a call of a ship in distress by
the  Australian  Coast Watch, thereby  starting a chain of
events that would capture the attention of the world for days
and lead to a complete overhaul in Australia’s immigration
policies. After taking aboard the 433 passengers, hailing
from Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, the captain
headed for Indonesia, the point of origin of his new passen-
gers. Complicating the situation, some of the hopeful asy-
lum seekers threatened to jump overboard if returned to
Indonesia. Considering this development and the deterio-
rating health of many of the passengers, the captain decided
to make way for Australia’s Christmas Island, the nearest
port. Australia denied permission to enter territorial waters
and proceeded to establish a naval blockade to prevent entry
into the port. The standoff ended with the interdiction of the
ship by the Australian Special Services and the removal of
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the asylum seekers onto an Australian  naval vessel and
eventually to refugee processing points around the Pacific.19
While refugee advocates in Australia attempted to force the
government to bring the asylum seekers to the mainland in
order to file their claims, the decision was ultimately in
favour of the state. The court’s message was clear: inter-
dictees had no rights under Australian law.
While Australia has a harsh detention policy towards
asylum seekers and makes use of other non-entrée policies,
interdiction represented a break from past dealings with
boat arrivals. Restrictionist policies have been the trend
since the Australian asylum system was challenged by the
arrival of Cambodian boat people in the late eighties.20
Despite the smaller numbers, in relevant terms this influx
compared with the arrival of thousands of Cubans and
Haitian in south Florida in the early eighties and was por-
trayed in a sensationalist manner by the media and manipu-
lated by politicians. Australia’s restrictionist policies should
be seen in light of their preoccupation with the asylum-
smuggling nexus. In order to combat this phenomenon,
Philip Ruddock, Immigration Minister during the John
Howard administrations, has taken an active stance in in-
itiating regional co-operation on this issue. The focus has
been a program involving the processing of refugee claims
in Indonesia with the co-operation of the Indonesian gov-
ernment, International Organization for Migration (IOM)
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR).21 In the year leading up to the Tampa crisis,
Australia did experience a significant increase in unauthor-
ized arrivals by sea. Despite the increase, Australia still hosts
extremely few refugees in comparison to a country such as
Canada, which is similarly isolated.22 The elevation of the
Tampa standoff to the level of a national crisis was a result
of campaign showmanship by the incumbent Prime Min-
ister, John Howard, eager to prove he could take a tough
stand on illegal immigration. Now that the elections have
come and gone, Howard and his controversial Immigration
Minister, Ruddock, have shown a continued commitment
to keeping asylum seekers at bay.
III. The Remaking of the “Outside”
In  the  language of immigration,  the  condition of being
“outside” contains multiple layers of meaning. The policy of
interdiction is both a reaction to and an agent in the imple-
mentation of these various meanings on three levels. At the
most physical level, “outside” refers to a potential entrant’s
physical location beyond the territorial domain of the state.
On a more abstract plain, domestic immigration laws rec-
ognize that an individual can be physically present in a state
and remain “outside” in legal terms. Finally, it is possible for
an individual to be within the jurisdictional control of the
state and remain “outside” the zone of juridical responsibil-
ity. The shifting emphasis of the condition of being “out-
side” is underscored by tensions between the various
branches of the government exerting their authority over
these meanings. These tensions are played out in increasing
judicial activism regarding immigration matters and the
subsequent challenge to the plenary power doctrine in the
U.S. and the corresponding legal basis for executive control
in Australia. As the importance of being legally “outside”
(but physically within a state) has eroded in the context of
domestic rights allocation, states have sought ways to reas-
sert their sovereignty  and, thus,  their  control over  who
remains physically “outside” the demarcated territorial
boundaries.23 Along with interdiction, Australia’s excision
of territory from their migration zone for the purpose of
limiting the claims of “offshore entrants” emphasizes the
capacity of the state to interpret the condition of being
“outside” in accordance with domestic concerns.
Immigration Law: The Changing Significance of
Positionality
A pillar of immigration law in liberal democratic countries
has historically been the de-linking of territoriality with
most rights-based claims. Citizenship, “an exclusive status
that confers on individuals rights and privileges within na-
tional boundaries,” exists to demarcate the insiders from the
outsiders.24 An embodiment of this distinction lies in the
development of parallel sets of entitlements regarding pro-
cedural guarantees in immigration proceedings depending
on an immigrant’s legal standing: deportation proceedings
apply to those legally within the country while exclusion
procedures apply to those legally outside. In the U.S., the case
history establishing the treatment of deportable and exclud-
able aliens stretches back to the 1903 Supreme Court case,
Yamataya v. Fisher.25 Subsequent judicial rulings established
that the right to due process, established by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, is granted to every person in
America: “even one whose presence in this country is un-
lawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitu-
tional protection.”26 These universalist interpretations of the
Constitution hinge on the use of the word “person” in a
portion of the Fourteenth Amendment, implying that the
following rights are not related to immigrant status: “nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”27
Lacking a bill of rights and without provisions for na-
tional citizenship until 1949, Australia is much less devel-
oped in its system of rights allocation according to
citizenship and migration status. In Australia, “it is difficult
to differentiate clearly between the rights of citizens and
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non-citizens because the rights of citizens themselves are
not always clearly and consistently defined.”28 Common
law with regard to equal legal protection and due process
has developed to the extent that certain basic rights are
clearly established for all persons in Australia.29 The Migra-
tion Act 1958 established the normative basis for the most
controversial feature of Australia’s immigration policies
that seek to differentiate between legal and illegal non-citi-
zens: mandatory detention policies.30 While rights are
granted at a diminishing rate as one considers the three
categories of citizen, legal non-citizen, and illegal non-citi-
zen, the important point remains that a certain level of
rights, albeit unequal, is bestowed upon all persons who
find themselves physically within Australian or American
territory.
In both Australia and the U.S., the domestic legal
boundaries delineating the inside from the outside have
become blurred over time as the gap between citizen and
non-citizen rights has diminished. This is consistent with a
general trend across liberal democratic states.31 The con-
tinuous evaluation and contestation of these boundaries by
the judiciary has been key to their devolution. The 1982
U.S. Supreme Court decision, Plyer v. Doe, granting chil-
dren of illegal aliens full access to public education, is the
most commonly cited example of this trend. With regard
to asylum-related concerns, courts have “brought to bear
the communitarian impetus of immigration law on the new
field of asylum,” challenging the deprivation of rights on
the basis of due process and equal protection provisions.32
In Australia, the courts have been consistently restricted
with regard to their authority to contest immigration-re-
lated matters. While still limiting the judiciary in many
respects, the passage of the Administrative Decisions (Judi-
cial Review) Act 1977 greatly expanded the reach of the
courts in immigration matters. As a result, the largest
caseload in the Federal Court involving Migration Act de-
cisions appeared in the mid-eighties. The caseload contin-
ued to swell by 161 per cent from 1995 to 2000.33 The arrival
of Cambodian boat people in the late nineties was also a
focal point in the judiciary’s role in both justifying and
challenging the government’s immigration policy.34 Inter-
diction policies represent an explicit intention to control
immigration beyond the scope of a judiciary that is
weighted more towards principles of inclusion than exclu-
sion.
The Re-emergence of Plenary Power: Operating
“Outside” the Law
In wresting control from the judiciary and asserting the
power of the executive  and Congress  (in the U.S.) and
Parliament (in Australia) over entry, interdiction policies
are grounded in the renewed application of the plenary
power doctrine. Entailing “the power to regulate immigra-
tion without judicial constraint,” this doctrine is grounded
in notions of absolute state sovereignty.35 Demonstrating the
conventional use of the doctrine, legislation in the U.S. and
Australia in recent years has asserted plenary power by
denying judicial review of immigration-related decisions. In
1996 the U.S. passed legislation providing for expedited
removal procedures that are not eligible for judicial review.
Even more recently, the U.S.A. Patriot Act gives the Attorney
General remarkable capabilities to detain non-citizens
loosely suspected of terrorist connections. Since the events
of September 11, 2001, national security discourse is the
trump, giving a whole new life to the reaches of the plenary
power doctrine on the domestic front.
Australia has also experienced perennial power struggles
regarding authority on immigration matters. Legislation
passed on September 21, 2001, redefines most immigration
and asylum-related decisions as falling under a “privative
clause,” signifying that they shall not “be challenged, ap-
pealed against, reviewed, quashed, or called in question in
any court.”36 Those that emphasize a new era of restricted
sovereignty and consider the plenary power doctrine (and
its Australian equivalent) to  be a “constitutional fossil”
underestimate the forces behind restrictionist immigration
controls such as interdiction.37
Interdiction policies exercise the plenary power doctrine
in two ways, exploiting the immunity inherent in the con-
dition of being  “outside”  on  different levels. The most
traditional form of plenary power application refers to the
ability of the executive and legislature to respond quickly
and flexibly to situations that concern the safety and welfare
of the nation. Since the process of judicial scrutiny often
stands in the way of expediency, it is bypassed in favour of
tools such as executive orders and emergency legislation.
Thus, the state is operating legally “outside” the reach of its
own courts. Interdiction also constitutes a twist on the old
practice of “judge-proofing” by operating physically “out-
side” the territorial boundaries of the state. Measures taken
to prevent entry into territorial waters have the effect of
“skewing the inquiry into an immigrant’s physical connec-
tion” to the state.38
In this regard, the controversial legal condition of extra-
territoriality is of the utmost importance. In the American
and Australian cases, interdiction policies evoke immunity
on both levels: the domestic policy formation process and
the extraterritorial application of the policy. Experiencing
many twists and turns under the direction of three Presi-
dents, the U.S. interdiction policy actually gained immu-
nity over time thanks to the decision in the Sale case.
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Whether or not this will be the case in Australia is yet to be
seen.
Reagan’s interdiction policies “effectively restored much
if not all of the immunity that the plenary power doctrine
originally established.”39 Reagan’s policy was enacted under
Constitutional and statutory provisions that granted ex-
press authority “whenever the President finds that the entry
of any aliens into the United Sates would be detrimental to
the interests of the United States, he may, by proclamation,
for such a period has he shall deem necessary suspend the
entry of all aliens or any class of aliens.”40 Illustrating just
how dramatic it was for the President to exercise this power,
the Task Force on Immigration assumed that an amend-
ment to current legislation would be necessary to legitimize
such a policy in the form of an “Emergency Interdiction
Act.” Due to the political pressures emanating from the
situation in Florida, the Reagan administration forged
ahead with a drastic  new  form  of immigration  control
making use of a statutory source of power that had not been
exercised by any President since becoming law in 1952.41
Unilaterally, Reagan declared, “The entry of undocu-
mented aliens from the high seas is hereby suspended and
shall be prevented by the interdiction of certain vessels
carrying such aliens.”42
Reactionary and politically motivated, the first act of
interdiction in Australia occurred entirely at the behest of
the executive before the official articulation of any policy
related to the actions. When the Tampa with its cargo of
433 asylum seekers entered Australia’s territorial waters
after being denied permission, the government responded
with the drastic measure of ordering the Special Armed
Forces to intercept and take control of the Tampa in the
appropriately named “Operation Reflex.” By doing so, the
Australian government proceeded to elevate the event into
a national security crisis, thereby justifying the executive’s
overarching decision-making power. The government pre-
sented the Border Protection Bill 2001 to the Parliament the
same day as troops boarded the Tampa. The main provi-
sions included the retrospective granting of “absolute dis-
cretion” to officers in the use of “reasonable force” against
any ship just inside the territorial sea to force it back out.
Most importantly,  the bill  declared  outright  that  inter-
dictees had no rights under Australian law and would not
be given an opportunity to seek refugee status.43 Although
this bill was voted down in the Senate (after passing in the
House of Representative), a very similar piece of legislation,
the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Pow-
ers) Bill 2001, was passed the following month.
The wording of Reagan’s original Executive Order did
not explicitly  deny the possibility  of  the extraterritorial
responsibilities to asylum seekers under America’s new
refugee regime. In fact, the active participation of the INS
in the interdiction of migrants and the provision that “no
person who is a refugee will be returned without his con-
sent” show a willingness to comply with these obligations.44
A year after the induction of the program, the U.S. Attorney
General wrote a letter to the UNHCR Chief of Mission in
Washington, D.C., confirming “the Administration is
firmly committed to the full observance of our interna-
tional obligations and traditions regarding refugees.”45
The reality of the U.S. interdiction program, however,
represents a sharp break from this well-intentioned rheto-
ric. Guidelines developed by the INS explained to staff their
responsibility in assuring that the U.S. is “in compliance
with its obligations regarding actions toward refugees, in-
cluding the necessity of being keenly attuned during any
interdiction program to any evidence that may reflect an
individual’s well-founded fear of persecution.”46 Due to the
inherent instability of the situation, however, INS officials
were only permitted to have contact with the interdictees at
the discretion of the Coast Guard officer in charge. The fact
that interdiction was scheduled to occur only outside the
territorial waters of the United States implies strongly that,
were the boarding of vessels to occur within the territorial
waters, a different set of procedural norms would apply.
This judge’s speculation regarding the extent of due process
allowed to interdictees represents this ambiguity: “Because
of the nature of the screening process and the fact that it
was to take place on the high seas, it could not have been
the intention of the President to allow the interdictees to
initiate judicial review of their cases in the district courts of
the United States.”47 The half-hearted provisions to provide
adequate screening blurred the implications of extraterri-
toriality.
Convincing evidence of procedural inadequacies lies in
the numbers of interdicted Haitians that successfully
availed themselves of protection. Ten years after Reagan’s
executive order, out of the 25,000 Haitians interdicted, only
twenty-eight were paroled into the U.S. to pursue asylum
claims.48 With mounting evidence against the government
pointing to irregularities in the system, Haitian advocates
seemed on the verge of a crucial decision acknowledging
the rights of interdictees to due process at least on a par with
exclusion proceedings. In November of 1991, a federal
court hearing Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker granted
an injunction, preventing the forced repatriation of Hai-
tians from Guatánamo Bay. By successfully bringing the
issue of extraterritorialty to a head, judicial activism forced
the executive to clarify its true intentions with regard to
interdiction.
With the issuance of the Kennebunkport Order in re-
sponse to a surge of interdictions following the coup in
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Haiti, Bush unequivocally rejected the extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. law relating to refugees. While Reagan’s
order had at least implied a responsibility to avoid refoule-
ment, the new policy explicitly states that U.S. law concern-
ing non-refoulement does “not extend to persons located
outside the territory of the United States.”  The  court’s
reasoning in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council legitimized this
position. At the end of the day, it was the Court’s reliance
on the presumption that “Acts of Congress do not ordinar-
ily apply outside our borders” that resounded the most
loudly.49 Regardless of the extraterritorial protections that
would normally apply, the majority opinion holds that the
plenary power doctrine supersedes such protections any-
way. Accordingly, the President possesses “ample power to
establish a naval blockade that would simply deny illegal
Haitian migrants the ability to disembark on our shores.”
The dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun dismissed
the majority’s  decision in Sale as based  on a “tortured
reading” of the Refugee Convention. His argument empha-
sizes the minimalist nature of the plaintiff’s claim: “The
refugees attempting to escape from Haiti do not claim a
right of admission to this country. They do not even argue
that the Government has no right to intercept their boats.
They demand only that the United States…cease forcibly
driving them back to detention, abuse and death.”50 One
cannot help but wonder if the court was somehow influ-
enced by the practical implications of a Haitian Centers
Council victory. An obligation to prevent refoulement
would go hand in hand with a refugee status determination
procedure. If conducted in a just and fair manner, this
could have led to the incorporation of tens of thousands of
Haitian refugees. The extraterritorial application of Article
33 was not a precedent they were prepared to set.
While Justice Blackmun was the lone dissenter on the
Supreme Court bench, his interpretation of the extraterri-
torial application of non-refoulement was backed up by the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in 1996.51
Despite the court’s decision that the norm of non-refoule-
ment should be extraterritorially applied, the non-binding
nature of the court’s decision and the second-tier status of
international law in American jurisprudence prevented the
development from directly affecting interdiction policy. In
fact, American’s reply to the commission’s findings stated
their position on the extra-territorial application of all
international human rights law: “The right to security of
the person does not create an obligation on states to provide
admission to persons fleeing their country by sea or pre-
clude their repatriation, even in the case of a bona fide
refugee.”52
Exraterritoriality: “Outside” in Every Sense?
In the Australian case, extraterritoriality functions in  a
unique sense not with regard to interdiction, a policy that
mirrors the post-Sale position in the U.S., but in the excep-
tional act of “excision.” The most interesting and controver-
sial immigration legislation passed in September 2001 was
undoubtedly the Migration Amendment (Excision  from
Migration Zone) Bill 2001. This legislation had the effect of
legally removing the outlying territories of Christmas Island,
Ashmore Reef, Cartier Islands, and Cocos Islands from
Australia’s “migration zone.” This can be seen as a backup
or complementary policy to interdiction: if in the case that
Coast Watch does not successfully interdict asylum seekers,
they will still be unable to access legal recourse on the dry
land they are most likely to reach. This policy creates the
immigration category of “offshore entry person” to refer to
non-citizens who enter Australia illegally via these territo-
ries. Thus the Australian state is simultaneously expanding,
in terms of its extraterritorial immigration control opera-
tions, and shrinking in terms of the territory for which it is
legally responsible. While interdiction exploits the gap be-
tween jurisdiction and juridical responsibility on the high
seas, Australia’s excision policy has created such a gap on its
own territory. By rewriting its own territorial obligations,
Australia has invented yet another meaning of “outside,”
asserting its sovereign  power  to define  its own  national
community.
IV. Interdiction and Refugee Protection:
Protection versus Rights to Protection
The long-standing policy of Haitian interdiction and Aus-
tralia’s new commitment to intercept asylum seekers be-
yond their territorial waters exposes a significant gap
between purported rights to protection and actual protec-
tion. Champions of refugee protection and experts in inter-
national law assert rights that conflict with the current
restrictionist climate: “Not only does the right to protection
against refoulement inhere before status determination, but
it applies as soon as a refugee comes under the de jure or de
facto jurisdiction of a state or party.”53 While many agree that
this right should apply, according to a resoundingly conclu-
sive decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, in reality it is not
enjoyed. Another theoretical application relevant to inter-
diction claims: “there is no principled reason to release states
which act extraterritorially from legal obligation that would
otherwise circumscribe the scope of their authority.”54 To
the detriment of refugee protection, such a legal obligation
is consistently recognized only in international law, how-
ever, and not by the states that are responsible for upholding
it. Joppke’s assertion that “human rights internationalists
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have inflated the effectiveness of international norms and
regimes” speaks to this imbalance.55
This gap exists because, despite the existence of a multi-
faceted international refugee regime, the locus of power
rests with states. There exists no legal doctrine or institu-
tional body that can effectively check the state (especially a
state such as the U.S. or Australia) with regard to its acts
and omissions in refugee protection. The primary interna-
tional instruments of refugee protection, the Refugee Con-
vention and its Protocol, are not self-executing. The
protection mechanisms and guidelines enshrined in these
documents gain strength only to the extent that they are
incorporated into the domestic law of the signatory states.
Significantly, individuals in need of protection possess no
right to asylum; “Governments grant asylum; individuals
‘enjoy’ it.”56 As shown by the case of interdiction, even the
complete incorporation of the tenets of the Refugee Con-
vention into the canon of domestic law provides no guar-
antees. Even the judiciary has the leverage to interpret
protection obligations with a slanted perspective that puts
national concerns ahead of what would seem to be justice
(as in the Sale case).
While the political and financial commitments of proac-
tive policies such as refugee resettlement speak encourag-
ingly to an overall commitment to the spirit of protection,
states maintain the convenience of interpreting their obli-
gation to refugees as “ex gratia,” implying whatever protec-
tion is provided results purely from humanitarian
goodwill.57 Evoking the uncertain grounding of the rights
of asylum seekers, an American refugee advocate laments,
“We have become minimalist in our demands…because
the violations committed by our government deny even
minimum standards of refugee protection that we thought
were no longer open to question.”58
The assertion of state sovereignty embodied by interdic-
tion policy highlights the relative weakness of UNHCR, the
international institution  mandated  with refugee  protec-
tion, to provide any recourse for asylum seekers in this
situation. According to the Refugee Convention, the role of
UNHCR is to supervise the administering of international
refugee protection. Emphasizing their reliance of the signa-
tory states in the fulfillment of their mandate, Article 35
states that the contracting parties must “undertake to co-
operate... and shall in particular facilitate its duty of super-
vising the application of the provisions of this Convention.”
In its supervisory role, however, UNHCR has not found an
effective way to assert itself when it finds states to be falling
short of their responsibilities under the Refugee Conven-
tion. Particularly crippling in its supervisory relationship
with countries such as the U.S. has been UNHCR’s heavy
reliance on major donors. The funding situations creates a
“Catch 22” in certain protection-related quandaries: strong
advocacy regarding protection claims contrary to the na-
tional interests of a  major  donor could  result  in fewer
resources and a de facto reduction in protection capacity.
A shocking example of this institutional weakness oc-
curred in High Commissioner Poul Hartling’s visit to the
U.S. in  late  1981 after the interdiction program  began.
Responding to criticisms after the trip regarding his failure
to confront the administration on its new policy, Hartling
said he was satisfied that the screening procedures were
“absolutely fair and fine.”59 While the UNHCR spoke out
against Australia’s handling of the Tampa incident, it was
unable to take any positive actions on behalf of the asylum
seekers at risk. The only concrete gesture they made was to
refuse to process a group of asylum seekers taken to Nauru
by Australia, claiming it was Australia’s responsibility to
carry out the status determination process for the popula-
tion in question.
This combination of nearly untouchable states, possess-
ing the power to act arbitrarily in pursuit of their own
interests, with a UNHCR incapable of posing a credible
challenge, represents the bleak realities of refugee protec-
tion in the current climate. Hope remains, however, when
one acknowledges that refugee protection exists, in its
strengths, not only its weaknesses, thanks to states. While
restrictionism is endogenous to the state, so are the liberal
democratic ideals that foster protection. If change occurs,
it will come from within: “Not external, but internal, con-
straints have prevented liberal states from shielding them-
selves completely from global refugee movements.”60
The judiciary has a powerful role to play in establishing
the norms of protection offered to asylum seekers. “Insu-
lated from the popular politics and empowered by devel-
opments in administrative and human rights law…the
courts have been able to expand the responsibilities of states
to foreigners, including  asylum  seekers.”61 Safeguarding
asylum seekers from the blow to protection dealt by inter-
diction policies presents a unique challenge. The Refugee
Convention is generally thorough in providing for the vari-
ous issues faced by asylum seekers, but interdiction is not
explicitly referred to. Because of this, “it is really only when
refugees are located on the high seas that they may fall
outside the purview of the existing refugee law regime.”62
The existing tool kit of protection must be used creatively
from within states in order to render these policies imprac-
ticable.
The central quandary posed by interdiction, extraterri-
toriality, will be most effectively addressed, not through a
groundbreaking ruling that will turn all of the courts pre-
vious decisions on their heads, but through a piecemeal
process. Motomura presents two such ways of addressing
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interdiction as a “unique” case of extraterritoriality. The
first relies on precedents wherein the state’s “affirmative
acts” with relation to an immigrant alter the legal obliga-
tions towards that immigrant. The other makes use of the
legal concept of the “functional equivalent of the border”
in order to provide interdictees protection from refoule-
ment.63 Establishing positive precedents in this regard is
helpful, but the ability of the executive to evoke national
security concerns as a trump could undermine such pro-
gress at any time. Despite this inherent weakness, the judi-
ciary remains empowered. For example, in the U.S. it has
been argued that the persistent attempts in the lower courts
to establish exceptions to plenary power “will eventually
lead the Supreme Court to ‘wear way’ the doctrine little by
little without expressly overruling its precedent.”64
V. Conclusion
Interdiction policies have the capacity to undermine refugee
protection in indirect and diffuse ways. Through their im-
plementation of interdiction, the U.S. and Australia have
sacrificed a degree of moral authority that will potentially
hinder regional co-operation arrangements and thwart their
ability to act as advocates for refugees worldwide. The dan-
ger of hypocrisy was particularly real with reference to
America’s advocacy on behalf of Indochinese refugees in
which the principle of first asylum was threatened by the
pushing back of boats by Southeast Asian countries. In the
wake of the Tampa standoff, Australia’s reputation as an
advocate for refugees has been similarly compromised. Re-
portedly, when demands were placed on President Mushar-
raf of Pakistan by the international community to open
Pakistan’s borders to fleeing Afghans, he replied, “If a rich
country like Australia could shut its doors to a few thousand
asylum seekers, why should a poor country like Pakistan –
which already hosts about 2 million refugees – take more?”65
The disconnect between both of these countries’ rhetoric
concerning refugee protection and their own behaviour
conveys a strong sense of the “not in my backyard” phe-
nomenon.
The most troubling aspect of Australia’s new policies is
the “Pacific Solution,” a self-proclaimed regional burden-
sharing agreement conceived to help Australia avert the
supposed impending national crisis. More realistically, the
plan was conceived to help Howard achieve his campaign
promise that not a single asylum seeker would reach Aus-
tralia’s shores if he were to be elected. Under this plan,
interdictees have been taken to processing camps on islands
in the Pacific. Governments of countries such as Nauru,
Fiji, and New Zealand were baited into accepting the asy-
lum seekers by millions of dollars in aid by the Australian
government. Fitzpatrick describes the problematic nature
of this arrangement: “Financial transfers may appear to be
a questionable substitute for the core obligation to provide
direct physical protection to refugees, especially where such
transfers take place between highly developed and lesser-
developed states and resemble ‘burden shifting.’”66 The
accusation that Australia has created a “new international
‘practice:’ the export of a refugee problem from one area to
another” is incorrect, however.67 In taking interdicted Hai-
tians to safe havens in developing countries around the
Caribbean, the U.S. deserves credit for authoring this un-
savoury “new international practice.” This practice has
opened up new frontiers in the debate on non-refoulement.
Refugee advocates adopt a liberal interpretation, claiming
that sending asylum seekers to countries such as Nauru that
are not signatories to the Refugee Convention could con-
stitute refoulement. While the risk of refoulement might
exist, a more real threat is posed by the undermining of the
principle of asylum.
In both cases, the need to implement such extensive
regional co-operation programs emphasizes two important
things about interdiction. The act of interdiction itself has
the potential of creating a “refugee in orbit” type of situ-
ation, and although there is no recognition of specific pro-
tection obligations, the interdicting state must deal with the
asylum seekers in one way or another. Even if states are not
bound by statutory obligations, interdiction exacts high
costs on states in the management of interdictees. That the
states are willing to pay such a high price to avoid admitting
asylum seekers onto their soil demonstrates the extreme
measures politicians are willing to take in order to foster the
appearance of control. Australian Treasurer Peter Costello
has predicted yearly costs of the Pacific Solution to be in the
vicinity of $450 million (in Australian dollars).68 This exor-
bitant amount of money being spent to keep out asylum
seekers far exceeds the resources it would take to receive
them through the appropriate channels in Australia.
Located both above and beyond the reach of the law,
interdiction policies exist in a unique realm exploited by
states to exert an unprecedented level of immigration con-
trol. The unchecked power of the U.S. and Australia in this
regard undermines notions that their sovereignty is being
eroded by the human rights regime and is subject to a “de
facto transnationalization of immigration policy.”69 These
policies represent a powerful reassertion of sovereignty on
behalf of the state. Contrary  to the depiction of reality
characterized by “the desacralization of territory and the
fraying of national communal boundaries,” interdiction
policies emphasize the persistent centrality of territoriality
with regard to refugee protection.70 Australia’s adoption of
interdiction and the complete overhaul of its immigration
laws twenty years after the inception of the Haitian Inter-
Volume 21 Refuge Number 4

diction Program suggests that the climate has, perhaps,
become even more conducive to such muscle-flexing by
states. As Brubaker writes, “Those who herald the emerging
postnational age are too hasty in condemning the nation-
state to the dustbin of history.”71
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